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need for structure and
expectancy-inconsistent information
Markus Kemmelmeier*
Interdisciplinary Ph.D. Program in Social Psychology, University of Nevada, Reno, NV, USA
Social-cognitive researchers have typically assumed that individuals high in need for
structure or need for closure tend to be closed-minded: they are motivated to resist
or ignore information that is inconsistent with existing beliefs but instead they rely on
category-based expectancies. The present paper argues that this conclusion is not
necessarily warranted because previous studies did not allow individual differences
in categorical processing to emerge and did not consider different distributions of
category-relevant information. Using a person memory paradigm, Experiments 1 and 2
shows that, when categorical processing is optional, high need-for-structure individuals
are especially likely to use this type processing to reduce uncertainty, which results
in superior recall for expectancy-inconsistent information. Experiment 2 demonstrates
that such information is also more likely to be used in judgment making, leading to
judgmental moderation among high need-for-structure individuals. Experiments 3 and
4 used a person memory paradigm which requires categorical processing regardless
of levels of need for structure. Experiments 3 and 4 demonstrate that, whether
expectancy-consistent or -inconsistent information is recalled better is a function of
whether the majority of available information is compatible or incompatible with an
initial category-based expectancy. Experiment 4 confirmed that the extent to which high
need-for-structure individuals attend to different types of information varies with their
distribution. The discussion highlights that task affordances have a critical influence on
the consequences of categorical processing for memory and social judgment. Thus,
high need for structure does not necessarily equate closed-mindedness.
Keywords: person memory, categorical processing, need for structure, intolerance of ambiguity, need for closure,
expectancies, social-cognition
Introduction
Much research in psychology and related social sciences assumes that people experience
ambiguity and uncertainty as aversive and seek to reduce it (e.g., Gudykunst, 1985; Levine,
1985; Hogg, 2000; Inglis, 2000; Kruglanski, 2004). Yet, there are also stark diﬀerences between
individuals, with some being much more tolerant of and others much more motivated to
reduce any uncertainty (e.g., Mclain, 1993; Webster and Kruglanski, 1994; Sorrentino and
Roney, 2000; Thompson et al., 2001). Generally, theorists suggest that ﬂight from ambiguity
and uncertainty implies closed-mindedness, which can be deﬁned as obstinate resistance to
unfamiliar or unwelcome ideas (e.g., Merriam-Webster’s online dictionary, n.d.). Closed-minded
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individuals cling to existing values and beliefs whereas new
experiences and new information, especially when they challenge
existing ideas, are discounted, if not altogether ignored (Driscoll
et al., 1991; Dijksterhuis et al., 1996; Kruglanski, 2004). The
present paper challenges the idea that seeking to replace
uncertainty with cognitive closure and structure necessarily
implies closed-mindedness. The same characteristics that may
make individuals aﬃrm existing beliefs, namely an overreliance
on categorical processing of social information, might also make
them more attentive to new and unexpected information. The
goal of the present research is to show under which circumstances
individual diﬀerences in dispositional intolerance for ambiguity
and need for structure make individuals more or less open to
unexpected information.
Early research on individual diﬀerences in closed-mindedness
focused on intolerance of ambiguity and pointed to this
concepts’ association with phenomena such as authoritarianism,
ethnocentrism and stereotyping (e.g., Rokeach, 1948; Frenkel-
Brunswik, 1949; Block and Block, 1951). Though modern
research has supported some of its conclusions (e.g.,
Kemmelmeier, 2007, 2010), this work was criticized based
on both methodological and theoretical grounds (e.g., Furnham
and Ribchester, 1995). Yet, to date there are two well-established
lines of research in social and personality psychology that carry
forth this tradition.
First, research on need for structure has demonstrated that
people vary in their inclination to reduce complexity when
thinking about and interacting with their social environment
(Neuberg and Newsom, 1993; Thompson et al., 2001). Because
they abhor ambiguity and lack of structure, those individuals high
in need for structure are more inclined to rely on stereotypes
(Neuberg andNewsom, 1993; Newheiser and Dovidio, 2012), and
are also more likely to acquire new stereotypes (Schaller et al.,
1995), even when presented with unbiased information (Gordon,
1997). Reliance on stereotypes and categorical representations
of others simpliﬁes and structures social-cognition, reducing
the processing eﬀort that is required (e.g., Brewer, 1988; Fiske
and Neuberg, 1990; Fiske et al., 1999). Further, this reduces
uncertainty by activating stereotypic knowledge, which allows
individuals to anticipate the behaviors and features of others
(Macrae and Bodenhausen, 2000). Consistent with the idea that
those motivated by a high need for structure rely heavily on
social categorization, Moskowitz (1993) demonstrated that such
individuals are more likely to make trait inferences based on
behaviors than individuals who are low in need for closure. In
other words, high need-for-closure individuals readily conclude
that someone who, for instance, won a chess tournament and
graduated magna cum laude must be member of the category of
“intelligent people” (see also Webster and Kruglanski, 1994).
The second, related line of research concerns the construct of
need for closure, that is, epistemic motivation to have any answer
on a given topic rather than expose the individual to continued
ambiguity (Kruglanski and Webster, 1996; Kruglanski, 2004).
This research assumes that all individuals are motivated to reduce
uncertainty; yet, people who are high in a dispositional need
for closure tend to reduce the feelings of discomfort induced by
uncertainty by relying on category-based processing (e.g., Brewer,
1988; Fiske et al., 1999). By contrast, individuals low in need
for closure are assumed to reduce uncertainty by engaging in
detailed, eﬀortful processing, which avoids the generalizations
that result from viewing others as exchangeable members
of a social category. Following vigorous debate (Kruglanski
et al., 1997; Neuberg et al., 1997a,b, contemporary research
now treats the need for structure construct and the need for
closure construct as largely exchangeable (e.g., Jost et al., 1999;
Bouckenooghe et al., 2007).
Dijksterhuis et al. (1996) have thus far produced the most
compelling evidence that need for closure implies closed-
mindedness, here conceived as individuals turning away or
even ignoring new and unexpected information. The authors
provided participants with general descriptions about a target
group (e.g., hooligans). Participants then read descriptions of
15 members of this group, ﬁve of which were engaged in
expected behavior (e.g., starting a bar ﬁght), ﬁve of which were
engaged in unexpected behavior (e.g., doesn’t drink alcohol) and
ﬁve of which were unrelated. Across two studies, Dijksterhuis
et al. (1996) documented that participants low in need for
closure were more attentive to and had a better memory for
behavior that was inconsistent with their initial expectancy. This
replicated a well-established ﬁnding based on which expectancy-
inconsistent information triggers eﬀortful cognitive processing
which, in turn, makes it more memorable and more likely to
be used in subsequent judgments (Hastie and Kumar, 1979;
Stangor and McMillan, 1992). However, participants high in
need for closure focused more on and were more likely to recall
behavior that conﬁrmed their initial expectancy, but ignored
evidence that contradicted their initial beliefs about the group
(see Driscoll et al., 1991 for similar ﬁndings involving diﬀerences
in uncertainty orientation). Because expectancy-inconsistent
information loomed larger for low need-for-closure participants,
they evaluated the group as less stereotypical than high need-for-
closure individuals.
The research reported here reexamines the generality of the
ﬁndings of Dijksterhuis et al. (1996). The focus is on need
for structure, which is measured using the 11-items Personal
Need for Structure scale (PNS; Neuberg and Newsom, 1993).
The PNS scale is composed of two separate factors: Desire for
Structure (DFS) reﬂects participants’ dispositional motivation
to create structure in their lives, whereas Response to Lack of
Structure (RLS) taps responses to unstructured, unpredictable
and generally ambiguous situations. Though much research
combines both factors into one, studies have documented distinct
correlates of the two subscales (e.g., Cavazos et al., 2012).
In the present research, the focal interest is on DFS. To the
extent that individuals encounter information about a target
that is ambiguous (e.g., because diﬀerent pieces of information
lead to contradictory conclusions), those high in DFS should
be highly motivated to restructure the information, that is, to
arrive at a simple cognitive structure. Arguably, when forming
an impression about a target person this means categorizing him
based on the available information (Moskowitz, 1993). If a critical
mass of the information suggests that the target is intelligent (or
not intelligent), this allows perceivers to bring order into their
experiences. By focusing only on part of what is known about
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the person, a perceiver who seizes on information suggesting
that the person is intelligent has a chance to categorize him as
“a smart person,” and thus simplify their representation of the
person. Given their inclination to reduce complexity in thinking
about others, high-DFS participants should be more inclined
than low-DFS individuals to categorize such a newly encountered
target.
To the extent that high-DFS participants readily categorize
a target person, this should bring to mind characteristics that
are typical for a member of this category. This category-based
information deﬁnes participants’ expectancies as to what other
information they might learn about the target person (e.g., Olson
et al., 1996). For instance, participants might expect “a smart
person” to have a stellar educational record. If they learn that
the person dropped out of high school, there is a need for them
to respond to this unexpected information. Researchers have
long argued that such information prompts eﬀorts to reconcile
it with one’s expectancy, with the resulting cognitive elaboration
making expectancy-inconsistent information more memorable
than expectancy-consistent information (e.g., Hastie and Kumar,
1979; Stangor and McMillan, 1992; but see Heider et al., 2007).
As a consequence, because they are more likely to engage in
categorical processing of a target, high-DFS should be more
attentive to expectancy-inconsistent information than low-DFS
individuals, and remember it better.
Recall that Dijksterhuis et al. (1996) did not obtain the pattern
of ﬁndings anticipated here. These authors found that high
need for structure reduced the attention paid to expectancy-
inconsistent information. One possible reason is that Dijksterhuis
et al. (1996), like many others (e.g., Srull et al., 1985; Driscoll et al.,
1991), provided participants with advance information about
the target, which primed a social category, and thus established
category-based expectancies prior to participants encountering
any additional information. That is, Dijksterhuis et al. (1996)
prompted categorical processing on the part of all participants
regardless of their level of need for structure. As a result, these
authors were able to examine whether high and low need for
structure participants would process expectancy-consistent and
expectancy-inconsistent information diﬀerently once categorical
processing was engaged, but not if participants would engage in
categorical processing or not.
The paradigm employed in the Experiments 1 and 2 diﬀers
from Dijksterhuis et al. (1996), though it uses another common
approach in research on impression formation (e.g., Hastie and
Kumar, 1979; Hemsley and Marmurek, 1982; Bargh and Thein,
1985). Rather than providing participants with category labels
in advance, expectancies are induced indirectly through the
distribution of the information made available to participants. If
the majority of the available information implies that the target
is intelligent, but only a minority of information implies he is
not intelligent, then participants arrive at the overall impression
that the target is intelligent, i.e., they may categorize the target
as “a smart person.” This approach is especially likely to render
information memorable that is inconsistent with the overall
impression conveyed by the majority of information (Stangor
and McMillan, 1992). Research does not always diﬀerentiate
whether participants are provided with an explicit categorization
or whether a suitable category has to be inferred by participants
(but see Neuberg et al., 1997b). However, for Experiments
1 and 2 the distinction is crucial: if high-DFS individuals
are more inclined to engage in categorical processing than
their low-DFS counterparts, this should only become apparent
when categorical processing is optional and the task does not
constrain whether eﬀortful (piecemeal) processing or categorical
processing is deployed. As demonstrated later in Experiments
3 and 4, requiring both high-DFS and low-DFS participants to
engage in categorical processing may engage diﬀerent processes
and result in diﬀerent eﬀects on memory.
Another contrast between the present research and
Dijksterhuis et al. (1996) is that these authors focused on
groups, whereas the present focus is on individuals. All members
of a group are not necessarily expected to behave in the same
way. Yet, people do expect a person to behave consistently;
that is, a person who is smart should also be able to ﬁnish high
school. Arguably, a person about whom expectancy-inconsistent
information becomes known seems to prompt much more
intense cognitive eﬀorts to reconcile new information with
existing one than is the case of groups, rendering inconsistent
information about individuals more memorable (e.g., Stern et al.,
1984; Srull et al., 1985).
Experiment 1
In the ﬁrst experiment participants were provided with a majority
of information that was intended to induce the overall impression
that the target person is either intelligent or unintelligent.
A subsequent recall task and a recognition task were expected
to reveal that participants high in DFS would more likely to
engage in categorical processing, resulting in better memory for
expectancy-inconsistent information. Thus, the prediction was:
Hypothesis 1: Compared to low-DFS individuals, high-DFS
individuals are more attentive to expectancy-inconsistent
information than expectancy-consistent information, and
remember it better.
It was also anticipated that those high in DFS would exhibit
evidence of categorical processing on the recognition task.
This should prompt high-DFS participants to falsely accept
information as previously seen if this information that was
directly relevant to the overall impression. That is, they would
produce more false alarms concerning such information, but not
neutral information.
Hypothesis 2: Compared to low-DFS individuals, high-DFS
individuals are more likely to exhibit in response biases on
a recognition memory task in favor of expectancy-relevant
information relative to neutral behaviors.
Participants
One hundred twenty-one undergraduates participated in this
research in exchange for partial course credit (52% women,
average age 18.7 years, range 17–23). At the beginning of the
term (2–6 weeks prior to the experiment), all students enrolled
in a large introductory psychology course (n > 1,100) completed
a six-item version (items 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, and 11; α= 0.86) of the PNS
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scale (Neuberg and Newsom, 1993), which correlated well with
the original 11-items scale (r = 0.88). Participants were recruited
based on whether their scores placed in them in the top (n = 62)
or bottom (n = 59) 20% of the distribution1.
Materials
Based on Fuhrman et al. (1989), 24 behavior descriptions
implying high intelligence were selected (average intelligence
ratings 7.4–8.9 on a nine-point Likert type scale). Sample
items included “Was voted most likely to succeed by members
of his class” and “Won a chess tournament.” Similarly, we
selected 24 behavior descriptions implying lack of intelligence
(average intelligence ratings 2.2–4.4 on the same scale). Sample
items included “Kept the windows open while running the air
conditioner” and “Flunked an aptitude test.” Also selected were
12 neutral items with middling intelligence ratings (average
rating 4.9–5.9). A comparison of normativity ratings, also by
Fuhrman et al. (1989), showed no diﬀerence between the three
types of behaviors.
Two diﬀerent stimulus sets were constructed based on half
of all behaviors selected from Fuhrman et al. (1989). The ﬁrst
stimulus set intended to convey the impression that Bob was
intelligent and included 12 intelligent behaviors, six unintelligent
behaviors and six neutral behaviors, all randomly chosen from
their respective pools (high intelligence list). A second stimulus
set conveyed that Bob was unintelligent and included 12
unintelligent, six intelligent and the same six neutral behaviors,
chosen from their respective pools of items (low intelligence
list). The smaller set of six behaviors of one list always was a
subset of the larger set of 12 behaviors of the other list. There
were two variants of the same stimulus set to ensure that, across
participants, each behavior was presented equally often as part of
the set of six and as part of the set of 12 behaviors. [The other half
of the behaviors selected from Fuhrman et al. (1989) was used to
generate foils for the recognition task.]
Procedure
Upon arrival to the laboratory, participants were told that they
would be participating in a study, in which they were to form
an impression about a target person (“Bob”). They then saw
24 behavior descriptions pertaining to that person. Half of the
participants saw the behaviors of the high intelligence list, and
half the behaviors of the low intelligence list. The majority of
behaviors (here: half of all behaviors presented) was expected
to determine the overall impression of Bob as intelligent or not
intelligent (see also Hastie and Kumar, 1979). For half of the
participants these 24 behaviors were provided simultaneously in
random order on a computer screen, with participants having as
much time as they wished to study the list. For the other half, the
24 behaviors were presented sequentially on a computer screen,
such that the each behavior appeared for 5 s, followed by a 1-s
blank screen. Within each presentation condition, stimulus order
1Pre-screening did not occur based on DFS only. However, because three of four
DFS items were included in the six-item PNS measure and DFS and RLS are
highly correlated (r > 0.54–0.74; Neuberg and Newsom, 1993), this recruitment
procedure ensured that participants were very high or low in DFS.
was counterbalanced, with half seeing the reverse order of the
other half.
Following the presentation of behavior descriptions, and after
a 2-min distractor task, participants were given 3 min to recall
as many of Bob’s behaviors as they could. Immediately afterward,
participants were asked to work on a recognition task in which
they were presented with the 24 previously viewed behaviors
intermingled with 24 new behaviors. That is, beyond the 12
old impression-deﬁning behaviors participants saw 12 new,
previously unseen ones; similarly, the six impression-inconsistent
behaviors were supplemented by six new behaviors of the same
kind, and the six previously viewed neutral behaviors were
presented alongside six new ones. All 48 behaviors were presented
in random order on a computer screen, and participants
indicated through predeﬁned key entries whether they had seen
the behavior before or not. However, because of equipment
malfunction or researcher error, 16 of 121 participants did not
complete this task.
Once the recognition task was completed, participants
completed the 11-items PNS scale (α = 0.90), based on which
the four-item DFS subscale (α = 0.88) and the seven-item RLS
subscale (α = 0.84) were computed (Neuberg and Newsom,
1993). Participants also completed the 22-item McLain tolerance
of ambiguity scale (α = 0.85), which did not qualify results, and
is thus not reported further. Finally, participants were thanked,
debriefed and dismissed.
Results
Recall
Participants recalled between 4 and 14 behaviors (M = 9.60).
Recall protocols were subsequently coded by two coders using
the gist criterion; that is, they were coded if the general
content and the valence of the behavior was preserved (e.g.,
Hastie and Kumar, 1979; Srull et al., 1985; Driscoll et al.,
1991). Disagreements between coders were resolved through
discussion. Recalled behaviors were categorized by whether they
were part of the 12 behaviors deﬁning the overall impression,
whether they were inconsistent with it, or whether they
were neutral. The number of recalled behaviors within each
category was subsequently divided by the number of behaviors
presented, and the resulting proportions submitted to a 2
(PNS: high vs. low) × 2 (Majority of Behaviors: Intelligent vs.
unintelligent)× 2 (Presentation: simultaneous vs. sequential)× 2
(Order) × 3 (Behavior Type: impression-deﬁning, inconsistent,
neutral) mixed factorial model with the last factor varying within
participants.
A main eﬀect for Behavior Type, F(2,104) = 37.39, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.42, showed that impression-inconsistent behaviors were
more likely to be recalled (M = 0.53) than either impression-
deﬁning (i.e., majority) behaviors (M= 0.37) or neutral behaviors
(M = 0.37). Critically, this eﬀect was qualiﬁed by a PNS x
Behavior Type interaction, F(2,104)= 3.96, p= 0.022, η2p = 0.07.
As displayed in Figure 1, high-PNS individuals were surprisingly
less likely to recall impression-deﬁning behaviors, p= 0.016, but,
as predicted by Hypothesis 1, somewhat more likely to recall
impression-inconsistent behaviors than low-PNS individuals,
p = 0.098, though there was no diﬀerence in the recall of
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FIGURE 1 | Likelihood of recall of impression-defining,
impression-inconsistent, and neutral behaviors as a function of PNS
(Experiment 1). Bars reflect one standard error above and below the mean.
neutral behaviors, p = 0.16. The only other eﬀect emerged
for Order, F(1,105) = 4.10, p = 0.046, η2p = 0.04, which did
not interact with any other experimental factor, and was thus
inconsequential.
This analysis was repeated by replacing the dichotomous
PNS variable with alternating the DFS scale or RLS subscales as
continuous predictor within the same general model. Though
both subscales were substantially correlated (r = 0.72), the
above two-way interaction with Behavior Type only emerged
for DFS, F(2,104) = 3.25, p = 0.043, η2p = 0.06, but
not RLS, F(2,104) = 0.65, p = 0.53, η2p = 0.01. (Outside
of the previously reported Order eﬀect, no other eﬀects
were signiﬁcant.) Consistent with Hypothesis 1, this pattern
suggests that the diﬀerential recall of impression-deﬁning and -
inconsistent items was mainly a function of individual diﬀerences
in DFS.
Recognition
Aﬁrst inspection revealed that correct identiﬁcation of previously
seen behaviors was high (95% hits on average) across all
behavior types, with false identiﬁcations of previously unseen
behaviors being low (on average 2% false alarms). In the
signal detection analysis, A’ served as non-parametric measure
of sensitivity, with 1 reﬂecting that participants distinguished
perfectly between previously seen and unseen items, and 0.50
indicating the lack of any distinction between the two kinds
of items (Stanislaw and Todorov, 1999). B” served as measure
of response bias ranging from −1 (extreme bias in favor of
“previously seen” responses) to +1 (extreme bias in favor of “not
previously seen” responses), and 0 reﬂecting the absence of any
bias.
Sensitivity (A’)
Using the above factorial model, a main eﬀect for Behavior Type,
F(2,86) = 4.36, p = 0.016, η2p = 0.09, indicated that sensitivity
was at least somewhat greater for both impression-deﬁning
behaviors (M = 0.983) and impression-inconsistent behaviors
(M= 0.987) compared to neutral behaviors (M= 0.977), p= 0.08
and p = 0.004, respectively2. A Behavior Type x Majority of
Behaviors interaction, F(2,86) = 5.11, p = 0.008, η2p = 0.11,
showed that this pattern primarily occurred when the target
person was presented as being of high intelligence. A PNS by
Majority of Behaviors interaction, F(1,87) = 6.04, p = 0.016,
η2p = 0.06, revealed that high-PNS participants were less sensitive
to the presence of previously seen vs. unseen items when the
majority of behaviors implied that Bob was intelligent rather
than unintelligent. However, this was the case irrespective of
Behavior Type, with all other eﬀects involving PNS being non-
signiﬁcant, all F < 2.82, p > 0.096, η2p < 0.04. Similar ﬁndings
were obtained when the dichotomous PNS variable was replaced
by either the continuous DFS or RLS predictors, though RLS
never interacted with Majority of Behavior. Altogether, DFS
was not related to any diﬀerential sensitivity of recognition
memory for impression-consistent and impression-inconsistent
information.
Response bias (B”)
ABehavior Typemain eﬀect, F(2,86)= 3.70, p= 0.029, η2p= 0.08,
showed that for impression-consistent behaviors (M = 0.25)
and neutral behaviors (M = 0.29) there was less of a tendency
to classify an item as not previously seen than for impression-
inconsistent items (M = 0.11). Recall that high PNS participants
were expected to recognize even previously unseen behaviors
as seen if they were impression-relevant, simply because they
would be more likely to rely on categorical processing; that is, for
this group B” was expected to be lower for impression relevant
behaviors. Though the Behavior Type × PNS interaction failed
to reach signiﬁcance, F(2,86) = 1.73, p = 0.18, η2p = 0.04, the
three-way interaction also involving Majority of Behavior was
reliable, F(2,86) = 4.87, p = 0.010, η2p = 0.10. As was conﬁrmed
in a subsequent contrast analysis (p = 0.027), for high-PNS
participants exposed a majority of unintelligent behaviors, B”
was lower for impression-relevant behaviors (Mconsistent = 0.21,
Minconsistent = −0.08) than neutral behaviors (M = 0.36);
yet, this pattern did not emerge for any other combination
for PNS and Majority of Behavior. Aside from the otherwise
inconsequential observation that simultaneous presentation of
the behaviors resulted in a higher B” than sequential presentation,
F(1,87) = 4.18, p = 0.044, η2p = 0.05, no other eﬀects were
signiﬁcant.
When PNS status was replaced with DFS, aside from
the Behavior Type main eﬀect, F(2,86) = 3.64, p = 0.030,
η2p = 0.08, a trend-level Behavior Type x DFS interaction,
F(2,86)= 2.61, p= 0.079, η2p = 0.06, conﬁrmed that for high DFS
participants (+1 SD above mean) B” for impression consistent
(M = 0.11) and impression-inconsistent behaviors (M = 0.05)
was higher than for neutral items (M = 0.33), p = 0.045 and
p = 0.006, respectively. No such pairwise diﬀerences emerged
for low DFS participants (−1 SD below mean; M = 0.36 and
0.15 vs. M = 0.22, both p > 0.20). As before, a Behavior
Type × PNS × Majority interaction, F(2,86) = 4.13, p = 0.019,
η2p = 0.09, indicated that this pattern occurred unevenly across
2Two outliers were removed from the recognition analyses because standardized
residuals were smaller than −4.
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the design, and was even further qualiﬁed by Presentation
Order, F(2,86) = 3.91, p = 0.024, η2p = 0.08. Whereas these
ﬁndings yield partial support for Hypothesis 2, note that the
model in which DFS was replaced with RLS yielded similar
ﬁndings. The Behavior Type x RLS interaction approached
signiﬁcance, F(2,86) = 3.01, p = 0.055, η2p = 0.07 (being further
qualiﬁed by Majority of Behavior, F(2,86) = 4.41, p = 0.015,
η2p = 0.09), thus conﬁrming the above-described pattern. Overall,
analyses of response bias provide at least some corroboration for
Hypothesis 2. Participants high in DFS are inclined to engage
in categorical processing such that they tend to falsely recognize
behaviors that are relevant to their overall impression of the
target.
Experiment 2
The second experiment sought to replicate the recall memory
ﬁndings of Experiment 1, and to examine whether the
greater attentiveness of high-DFS participants would extend
to judgments about the target (cf. Dijksterhuis et al., 1996).
Judgments are critical in that they often shape one’s behavior
toward a target, thus rendering recalled information relevant to
social interaction. If high-DFS participants are more likely to
engage in categorical processing, they should not only attend to
impression-inconsistent information more and recall it better,
but rely on it more in their evaluations, and thus produce more
moderate judgments.
Hypothesis 3: Compared to low-DFS individuals, to the
extent that high-DFS individuals recall impression-inconsistent
information better than impression-consistent information, they
are less extreme in their judgments.
Participants
One hundred-two undergraduate students participated in this
research in exchange for course credit (31% women, average age
19.0 years, range 17–24).
Materials and Procedure
Materials were identical to Experiment 1. However, the
presentation of behaviors of Bob was simpliﬁed with all
participants receiving a mostly high intelligence set (1/2
intelligent, 1/4 unintelligent) or a mostly low intelligence set
(1/2 unintelligent, 1/4 intelligent) of behaviors as part of a
booklet, all in the same order. Participants were asked to
study the list until they felt they knew what kind of person
Bob is (typically less than 3 min). Prior to a 2-min distractor
and the subsequent recall task, participants were asked to rate
Bob on seven diﬀerent trait dimensions using a seven-point
Likert-type rating scale. Three traits were used to form an
intelligence score [intelligent, bright, simple-minded (reversed),
α = 0.66]. [The remaining traits (forgetful, likable, interesting,
boring) did not yield any relevant results.] Then, participants
worked on the same recall task as in Experiment 1, and
completed the PNS scale (α = 0.79), based on which the DFS
subscale (α = 0.70) and the RLS subscale (α = 0.71) were
computed.
Results
Judgments
Intelligence scores were entered into an analysis with (Majority
of Behaviors: Intelligent vs. unintelligent) as between-groups
factor and alternatingly the two PNS subscales as continuous
predictor. The model involving DFS produced the expected main
eﬀect for Majority of Behaviors, such that participants who
had learned about more intelligent behaviors than unintelligent
behaviors of Bob rated him as more intelligent compared to
participants who had learned about more unintelligent than
intelligent behaviors (M = 5.02 vs. 4.29), F(1,98) = 13.82,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.12. However, a Majority of Behaviors x DFS
interaction, F(1,98) = 3.82, p = 0.053, η2p = 0.04, revealed that
among individuals low in DFS (1 SD below mean) the eﬀect
of Majority of Behaviors was pronounced (M = 5.03 vs. 3.95),
p < 0.001; yet, among those high in DFS (+1 SD above mean),
Majority of Behaviors was practically irrelevant for intelligence
ratings (M = 5.02 vs. 4.69), p = 0.22. In other words, individuals
high in DFS were less swayed by the preponderance of intelligent
or unintelligent behaviors. Parallel analyses for RLS did not
replicate this interaction, supporting that eﬀects are unique to
DFS.
Recall
Protocols were coded and analyzed as in Experiment 1
(average behaviors recalled M = 8.58, range 0–15). Proportions
of impression-deﬁning, -inconsistent and neutral items were
submitted to a principal component analysis, which included
Behavior Type andMajority of Behaviors as categorical predictors
and again either DFS or RLS as continuous predictors.
Across both models (i.e., including DFS or RLS), impression-
inconsistent behaviors were more easily recalled (M = 0.46) than
either impression-deﬁning (M = 0.33) or neutral (M = 0.31)
behaviors, both F(2,97)> 23.54, p< 0.001, η2p > 0.32. The model
including DFS replicated the Behavior Type x DFS interaction
previously obtained in Experiment 1, F(2,97) = 3.59, p = 0.031,
η2p = 0.07. Participants high in DFS (+1 SD above mean)
were more likely to recall impression-inconsistent behaviors than
those low in DFS (−1 SD below mean; M = 0.51 vs. 0.41),
p = 0.016, though no comparable diﬀerence was obtained for
impression-deﬁning behaviors (M = 0.32 vs. 0.33), p= 0.83, and
neutral behaviors (M = 0.31 vs. 0.32), p = 0.83. The equivalent
interaction was not signiﬁcant in the model involving RLS, F< 1,
η2p = 0.02.
Relationship between Judgment and Recall
Hypothesis 3 assumes that judgments and recalled behaviors are
related, presumably because participants base their ratings on
the behaviors that they retained from studying the list (see Stern
et al., 1984). To address this possibility, we divided the number
of impression-consistent behaviors recalled by the number of
impression-inconsistent behaviors recalled. (Here and elsewhere
in this report, this ratio could not be computed for participants
who did not recall any inconsistent behaviors). The resulting ratio
correlated positively with the intelligence score when themajority
of behaviors created the impression that Bob is highly intelligent,
r(47) = 0.34, p = 0.020, but negatively when the majority
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of behaviors created the impression that Bob is unintelligent,
r(49) = −0.31, p = 0.032, suggesting a close link between
judgment and recall memory3. This pattern is consistent with
the idea that, even though the majority of behaviors implied
high intelligence, high-DFS individuals rated Bob’s intelligence
to be lower because they had a relatively better memory for his
unintelligent behaviors than low-DFS individuals. Conversely,
when the majority of behaviors implied low intelligence, high-
DFS individuals rated Bob’s intelligence to be higher presumably
because they retained relatively more information about this
intelligent behavior.
Experiment 3
Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated that those high in DFS are
highly attuned to inconsistent information when they learned
about a person’s behaviors. Unlike the studies reported by
Dijksterhuis et al. (1996), participants did not have any particular
expectancy about the target, which allowed these experiments to
reveal whether individuals high or low in DFS would vary in their
inclination to engage in social categorization.
But what if individuals already hold an expectancy as they
confront situations with diﬀerent distributions of information?
That is, participants may hold category-based expectancies about
a target, but the actual characteristics of the target might
either conﬁrm or disconﬁrm the initial expectancy. Experiments
3 and 4 explores the consequences of individual diﬀerences
in DFS for this type of situation. Speciﬁcally, as part of
Experiment 3, participants learned that the target person (Bob)
is either highly intelligent or clearly below average intelligence.
Subsequently, participants were provided with the same 24
behaviors as in Experiment 2, but in one condition the majority
of behaviors conﬁrmed the prior expectancy, whereas in another
condition the majority of behaviors contradicted the prior
expectancy.
Based on the earlier analysis, advance categorization of
Bob as smart person or not-so-smart person should now
trigger categorical processing on the part of all participants,
regardless of whether they are high or low in DFS. Still,
a DFS should motivate individuals to hold on to an initial
category-based expectancies as much as possible, as not doing
so would only open them up to uncertainty and ambiguity
(Neuberg and Newsom, 1993; Kruglanski, 2004). Speciﬁcally,
in extension of Dijksterhuis et al. (1996), one might predict
that for individuals high in DFS preexisting expectancies will
direct attention to expectancy-consistent information rather
than expectancy-inconsistent information, and produce superior
memory for the former and inferior memory for the latter type
of information. Moreover, high desire-for-structure individuals
should now arrive at more stereotypical judgments. In other
words, having a category-based expectancy might allow for
closed-mindedness to emerge, such that high desire-for-structure
individuals are motivated to conﬁrm an initial expectancy
3When the two Majority of Behavior conditions were combined, the correlation
between recall ratio and judgment was conﬁrmed, r(96) = 0.24, p = 0.017.
in part by ignoring unexpected information (cf. Kruglanski,
2004).
Yet, as amply demonstrated in the literature, the consequences
of categorical processing for memory and judgment vary with
the circumstances (see Macrae and Bodenhausen, 2000 for a
review). For instance, reviews of the last two and a half decades
have routinely highlighted that there is considerable situational
variability in whether expectancy-consistent and expectancy-
inconsistent information is remembered better (e.g., Rojahn
and Pettigrew, 1992; Stangor and McMillan, 1992; Fyock and
Stangor, 1994; Macrae and Bodenhausen, 2000; Skowronski
et al., 2013). Speciﬁcally, Sherman et al.’s (1998) “encoding
ﬂexibility” model argues that category-based expectancies serve
to enhance the eﬃciency of information processing. Though
expectancy-consistent information is typically processed more
easily, such information may receive only a minimum of
attention, simply because a perceiver does not invest attentional
resources unnecessarily in the processing of information
whose gist is already known. Rather, attentional resources
are devoted to information that is new and unexpected (see
also Johnston and Hawley, 1994). As Hilton et al. (1991)
put it: “When perceivers receive information that is initially
consistent with their expectations, they often assume that their
expectations are correct and quickly allocate their attention
elsewhere.”
High DFS motivates individuals not only to engage in
categorical processing (as demonstrated in Experiments 1 and 2)
but also to rely on social categories in their perception of the
world. But even though social categories give rise to category-
based expectancies, such expectancies may not necessarily direct
attention to expectancy-conﬁrmation information. Rather, the
consequences of category-based processing should be sensitive to
the nature and distribution of the available information. That is,
whether high DFS enhances attention to and subsequent memory
of expectancy-consistent or expectancy-inconsistent information
should depend on whether most of the available information
supports or contradicts the expectancies.
Category-based expectancies should render especially
individuals with a high DFS particularly sensitive to information
that is inconsistent with their expectancy when the majority
of the available evidence supports the expectancy. When
individuals expect Bob to be intelligent, but realize that most
of Bob’s behaviors support this very idea, they are likely to shift
attention away from what they feel they know already to that
which is new and surprising. The expected pattern is similar to
what was observed in Experiments 1 and 2. Yet, it is clear that
any diﬀerences between high and low DFS individuals are not
due to whether they engage in categorical processing or not since
the task requires all participants to do so. Thus, the prediction is:
Hypothesis 4: When the majority of available information
conﬁrms an initial category-based expectancy, high-DFS
individuals are more attentive to expectancy-inconsistent
information than expectancy-consistent information, and
remember it better than is the case for low-DFS individuals.
When, however, cursory processing reveals that the
majority of the available information does not match
individuals’ category-based expectancies, attention should
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shift to expectancy-consistent information. When participants
expect Bob to be intelligent, but face an array of diverse
information which does not support this notion, especially those
who are high in DFS are likely to attend to information that
supports Bob’s intelligence. The prospect of having their existing
beliefs overturned should motivate these individuals to hold on
to their categorical expectancy, allowing them to avoid ambiguity
and uncertainty. Thus, the prediction is:
Hypothesis 5: When the majority of available information
does not conﬁrm an initial category-based expectancy, high-
DFS individuals are more attentive to expectancy-consistent
information than expectancy-inconsistent information, and
remember it better than is the case for low-DFS individuals.
Interestingly, in the Dijksterhuis et al. (1996) paradigm
two-thirds of the available information either disconﬁrmed
participants’ category-based expectancy or was neutral, with
only a minority (one third of items) being consistent with the
expectancy. Hence, similar to what is anticipated in Hypothesis
5, to reduce uncertainty Dijksterhuis et al.’s (1996) high need-
for-closure participants might have relied on their expectancy
to seek out and dwelled on expectancy-consistent information.
This resulted in better memory of and greater weight assigned to
expectancy-consistent information.
Participants
Eighty undergraduates participated in exchange for partial course
credit (43% women, average age 19.0 years, range 18–23).
Materials and Procedure
Materials were identical to the previous experiments. Again,
participants were instructed to form an impression about a target
person named Bob. However, before participants either received
the high intelligence list (12 intelligent, 6 unintelligent, 6 neutral
behaviors) or low intelligence list (12 unintelligent, 6 intelligent, 6
neutral behaviors), they received some general information about
what kind of person Bob is (adapted from Driscoll et al., 1991). In
the high expectancy condition participants read: “In fact, Bob is
very intelligent. His sharp quick mind has always helped him to
excel at almost anything he does.” The low expectancy condition
read: “In fact, Bob is of below average intelligence. His mind
works slowly and has always prevented him from excelling at
almost anything he does.”
Following the same distractor task as in Experiment 1,
participants engaged in the 3-min recall task. On the next page
in the booklet participants rated Bob on 11 trait dimensions,
which included the seven used in Experiment 2 plus shy,
honest, outgoing and smart. Four intelligence-related ratings
were combined into an intelligence score [intelligent, bright,
smart, simple-minded (reversed); α= 0.76]. (Again, other ratings
did not yield pertinent results.) Later in the session, participants
completed the PNS scale (α = 0.76), based on which again the
DFS (α = 0.70) and the RLS scores (α= 0.66) were generated.
Results
Recall
Protocols were coded and analyzed as before (average behaviors
recalledM = 7.61, range 1–16). Proportions of recalled behaviors
were submitted to a 2 (Expectancy: high vs. low intelligence) × 2
(Majority of Behaviors: intelligent vs. unintelligent) × 3
(Behavior Type: expectancy-consistent, expectancy-inconsistent
and neutral) factorial analysis, in which Behavior Type was a
repeated-measures factor and alternatingly DFS or RLS were used
as continuous predictors.
Across both models a main eﬀect of Behavior Type emerged,
both F(2,71) > 7.51, p < 0.002, η2p > 0.17, showing that
expectancy-consistent and expectancy-inconsistent behaviors
were equally likely to be recalled (M = 0.35 and 0.35), though
more than neutral behaviors (M = 0.26). In both models there
was also a Behavior Type x Expectancy x Majority of Behaviors
three-way interaction, both F(2,71) > 5.98, p< 0.004, η2p > 0.14.
However, only in the model including DFS was this three-way
term further qualiﬁed by a four-way interaction, F(2,71) = 3.69,
p = 0.030, η2p = 0.09. The diagnosis of this four-way interaction
focuses exclusively on participants high in DFS (+1 SD above
mean) because for low-DFS participants (−1 SD below mean),
there was no evidence of diﬀerential recall of behavior types,
all pairwise comparisons p > 0.15. As displayed in Figure 2,
when high-DFS participants expected Bob to be highly intelligent,
and the majority of behaviors supported this, high-DFS
participants were more likely to recall expectancy-inconsistent
(i.e., unintelligent) behaviors than expectancy-consistent or
neutral behaviors, p= 0.049 and p= 0.037, respectively (Figure 2,
leftmost panel). Likewise, when participants expected Bob to
be of low intelligence, and the majority of behaviors supported
this idea, high-DFS participants were more likely to recall
expectancy-inconsistent (i.e., intelligent) behaviors than either
expectancy-consistent or neutral ones, p = 0.035 and p = 0.054,
respectively (Figure 2, rightmost panel). Compared to their
low-DFS counterparts, high-DFS participants recalled a greater
share of expectancy-inconsistent information when given a low-
intelligence expectancy (M = 0.50 vs. 0.33), p = 0.055, though
not with a high-intelligence expectancy (M = 0.42 vs. 0.32),
p = 0.39. Overall, this pattern conﬁrmed Hypothesis 4 in that in
the presence of mostly expectancy-consistent information, high
DFS were particularly attentive to the presence of expectancy-
inconsistent behaviors.
However, when the majority of information did not match
prior expectancies, high-DFS participants were more likely to
recall expectancy-consistent information. When they expected
Bob to be intelligent, but the behaviors mainly documented
a lack of intelligence, high-DFS participants were likely to
recall expectancy-consistent (i.e., intelligent) behaviors than
either expectancy-inconsistent or neutral behaviors, p = 0.015
and p = 0.005 (Figure 2, center-left panel). Similarly, when
expecting Bob to be of low intelligence, but the list of behaviors
mainly showed the opposite, high-DFS participants were
more likely to recall expectancy-consistent (i.e., unintelligent)
behaviors than either expectancy-inconsistent or neutral
behaviors, p = 0.027 and p = 0.001 (Figure 2, center-right
panel). Pairwise comparisons between high-DFS and low-DFS
participants showed that the former recalled more consistent
behaviors when given a low-intelligence expectancy (M = 0.49
vs. 0.24), p = 0.007, though not with a high-intelligence
expectancy (M = 0.46 vs. 0.44), p = 0.81. Conﬁrming
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FIGURE 2 | Likelihood of recall of expectancy-consistent, expectancy-inconsistent, and neutral behaviors as a function of expectancy and majority
of behaviors (Experiment 3). Bars reflect one standard error above and below the mean.
Hypothesis 5 and replicating Dijksterhuis et al. (1996), this
pattern demonstrates that high desire-for-structure individuals
are sometimes more attuned to expectancy-consistent than
expectancy-inconsistent information, even when ﬁndings
reported above showed that the pattern might be reversed
under diﬀerent circumstances. No other eﬀects involving
Behavior Type approached signiﬁcance, nor did the same
four-way interaction emerge when DFS was replaced with
RLS.
Judgments
Using a 2 (Expectancy) × 2 (Majority of Behaviors) factorial
analysis with either DFS or RLS as a continuous predictor
showed that participants rated Bob as more intelligent when
they expected him to be intelligent, both F(1,72) > 8.69,
p < 0.005, η2p > 0.10. Likewise, participants rated Bob as
more intelligent when they received a list which included 12
intelligent behaviors instead of 12 unintelligent behaviors, both
F(1,72) > 5.71, p < 0.02, η2p > 0.07. DFS (but not RLS)
interacted with Majority of Behaviors, F(1,72) = 4.34, p = 0.041,
η2p = 0.06. Regardless of participants’ expectancy (three-way
F < 1), low-DFS participants (1 SD below mean) rated Bob to
be more intelligent if the majority of the behaviors supported this
conclusion compared to when the majority led to the opposite
conclusion (M = 5.37 vs. 4.25), p = 0.002. However, among
high-DFS participants (1 SD above mean), this comparison was
not signiﬁcant (M = 4.83 vs. 4.74), p = 0.78. No other eﬀects
materialized.
Relationship between Judgment and Recall
The ratio of expectancy-consistent behaviors to expectancy-
inconsistent behaviors correlated somewhat positively with
the intelligence rating when participants expected Bob to be
intelligent and when the majority of the behaviors supported this
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conclusion, r(19)= 0.39, p= 0.095. However, the corresponding
correlation was negative when participants expected Bob to be
unintelligent with the majority of the behaviors supporting this
conclusion, r(20) = –0.40, p = 0.092. That is, when expectancy
and the majority of behaviors were aligned, relative recall of
intelligent and unintelligent behavior was reﬂected in judgments.
The strength of this relationship was weakened when expectancy
and majority of evidence were not aligned, r(19)= 0.11, p= 0.66
and r(19)=−0.22, p= 0.36, respectively, though the direction of
the coeﬃcients remained unchanged4.
Experiment 4
Though in Experiments 1–3 it was presumed that attentional
processes are at the heart of the demonstrated memory and
judgment eﬀects, none of these studies provided any direct
evidence. Thus, the goal of Experiment 4 was to replicate
aspects of Experiment 3 and to tap the process of how
individuals high or low in DFS allocate attention. Similar
to Dijksterhuis et al. (1996), Experiment 4 measured how
long participants wished to think about expectancy-consistent
and expectancy-inconsistent behaviors, and which were either
provided as part of a majority or a minority of behaviors.
Note that previous research has established that expectancy-
inconsistent information is particularly attention-grabbing (e.g.,
White and Carlston, 1983; Sherman et al., 1998). Speciﬁcally,
Stern et al. (1984) demonstrated that individuals spend more
time reading expectancy-inconsistent compared to expectancy-
consistent behaviors, presumably to reconcile the behavior with
their expectancy. However, consistent with Hypothesis 4, it
was expected that high desire-for-structure individuals would
attend primarily to expectancy-inconsistent information if the
majority of the information provided was expectancy consistent.
Conversely, and consistent with Hypothesis 5, high desire-for-
structure individuals were expected to attend to expectancy-
consistent information more than -inconsistent information
when the majority of available information was expectancy-
inconsistent.
Participants
A total of 104 undergraduate students from a large introductory
psychology course participated in this research in exchange
for partial course credit. As in Experiment 1 participants were
either from the bottom (n = 53) or top (n = 51) 20% of
the distribution of the six-item short-version of the PNS scale
(α = 0.86; Neuberg and Newsom, 1993), which all students
completed at the beginning of the semester.
Materials and Procedure
The procedure was similar to Experiment 3. Participants read
a paragraph with a general description of Bob, followed by
24 behaviors, of which either 12 or 6 were consistent with
4When collapsing across expectancy conditions, when expectancy and majority
of behaviors were aligned, the correlation between recall ratio and judgment was
substantial, r(38) = 0.31, p = 0.06, but was signiﬁcantly lower when expectancy and
majority of behaviors were not aligned with each other, r(39) = 0.12, p = 0.47.
the expectancy, and 6 or 12 were inconsistent with the
expectancy, with 6 behaviors always being neutral. In contrast to
Experiment 3, all participants read the same paragraph leading
them to expect Bob to be highly intelligent. Participants were
then presented with all 24 behaviors sequentially on a computer
screen. Other than in the sequential presentation condition of
Experiment 1, though, participants proceeded at their own pace
such that they pressed a key to see one behavior after the other.
The time between when the behavior appearing on screen and
participants used a keystroke to advance to the next behavior was
recorded by the computer and served as a measure of reading
time.
Based on 12 intelligent and 12 unintelligent behaviors, again
two high intelligence lists (12 intelligent and 6 unintelligent
behaviors) and two low intelligence lists (12 unintelligent and
6 intelligent behaviors) were constructed. As noted before, this
was done to ensure that, across participants, each behavior would
be used equally often as part of the group of six behaviors in
the minority. Each list was presented in the same random order,
though the ﬁrst behavior was always expectancy-consistent.
Following a distractor, participants engaged in the 3-min recall
task and complete the same trait ratings as in Experiment 3.
However, the order of these two tasks was counterbalanced, with
half receiving the recall task ﬁrst, and half receiving the judgment
task ﬁrst5.
Results
Reading Times6
A 2 (PNS) × 2 (Majority of Behaviors) × 2 (List version) × 3
(Behavior Type) analysis revealed that participants spent
more time on expectancy-consistent (i.e., intelligent) behaviors
(M = 5.18 s) and expectancy-inconsistent (i.e., unintelligent)
behaviors (M = 5.28 s) than on neutral behaviors (M = 4.85 s),
F(2,71) = 6.15, p = 0.003, η2p = 0.14. This eﬀect was qualiﬁed
by Majority of Behaviors, F(2,73) = 5.98, p = 0.004, η2p = 0.14.
More importantly, the three-way interaction involving Behavior
Type, Majority of Behavior and PNS was signiﬁcant, too,
F(2,73) = 4.27, p = 0.018, η2p = 0.10. As shown in Figure 3,
when the majority of behavior descriptions was consistent with
the initial expectancy that Bob was intelligent, all participants
spent more time on expectancy-inconsistent behaviors, though
the diﬀerence between consistent and inconsistent behaviors was
only reliable for high-PNS individuals, p = 0.008, but not low-
PNS individuals, p = 0.23. Conversely, when the majority of
behaviors presented to participants was inconsistent with the
initial expectancy, high-PNS individuals spent more time reading
the expectancy-consistent than the expectancy-inconsistent
behaviors, p = 0.035, though again low-PNS individuals showed
no diﬀerence, p = 0.96. This pattern conﬁrmed that, depending
on the informational context, individuals high in a DFS are
variably more sensitive to expectancy-consistent or expectancy-
inconsistent information. Note, though, that PNS seemed to
5Participants also completed the PNS scale, and indicated their age and gender, but
regrettably these data were lost.
6Because of user error and technical complications, reading-time data for 22
participants were not recorded.
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FIGURE 3 | Reading times for expectancy-consistent,
expectancy-inconsistent and neutral behaviors as a function of
majority of behaviors and PNS (Experiment 4). Bars indicate one
standard error above and below the mean.
mainly inﬂuence the relative time participants devoted to
diﬀerent kinds of items: in no case did reading times for low-PNS
or high-PNS participants diﬀer reliably, all p< 0.23.
Recall
Again, it was observed that expectancy-consistent and
expectancy-inconsistent behaviors were more likely to be
recalled than neutral behaviors, F(2,87) = 14.93, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.26, which was qualiﬁed by Majority of Behaviors,
F(2,87) = 7.30, p = 0.001, η2p = 0.14. Critically, there was
also a Behavior Type x Majority of Behaviors x PNS three-
way interaction, F(2,87) = 2.90, p = 0.060, η2p = 0.06. When
the majority of behaviors supported participants’ expectancy,
high-PNS individuals were more likely to recall expectancy-
inconsistent behaviors rather than expectancy-consistent
ones (M = 0.50 vs. 0.42), p = 0.040, whereas this was not
true for low PNS participants (M = 0.45 vs. 0.50), p = 0.18.
However, when the majority of behaviors was inconsistent
with participants’ expectancy, high-PNS participants recalled
expectancy-consistent behaviors better than expectancy-
inconsistent ones (M = 0.48 vs. 0.33), p< 0.001, though this was
also true for low-PNS individuals (M = 0.45 vs. 0.36), p= 0.017.
Judgment
Participants who had seen a majority of intelligent behaviors
considered Bob more intelligent, F(1,88) = 6.73, p = 0.011,
η2p = 0.07. The eﬀect was somewhat qualiﬁed by PNS,
F(1,88) = 2.74, p = 0.10, η2p = 0.03, though closer inspection
revealed that low-PNS participants evaluated Bob as more
intelligent when the majority of behaviors was intelligent
compared to when it was not intelligent (M = 5.79 vs. 4.94),
p = 0.003, though no such diﬀerences emerged for high-PNS
participants (M = 5.26 vs. 5.05), p = 0.48. Low-PNS participants
rated Bob as more intelligent than high-PNS participants when
both prior expectancy and the majority of behaviors led to the
same conclusion (M = 5.79 vs. 5.26), p= 0.055.
Correlations
When reading times for consistent behaviors were divided by
reading times for inconsistent behaviors, the resulting ratio
was positively correlated with the relatively greater recall of
consistent to inconsistent behaviors, r(81) = 0.28, p = 0.014,
replicating Stern et al. (1984). This is consistent with the idea that
more eﬀortful encoding is correlated with better recall, though
this association was only signiﬁcant when recall followed the
judgment task, r(42) = 0.33, p = 0.032, not when these tasks
were reversed, r(39) = 0.19, p = 0.25. The ratio for reading
times was uncorrelated with intelligence judgments, r(81) = –
0.05, p = 0.65. Similarly, the ratio of intelligent-to-unintelligent
behaviors recalled was not related to intelligence judgments of,
r(103) = −0.02, and this coeﬃcient did not vary as a function
of the order in which participants worked on the recall and
judgment tasks7.
Discussion
The present series of experiments sought to investigate if need
for structure necessarily implies closed-mindedness, which was
understood as individuals disregarding new and unexpected
information. Much of the existing literature on need for closure
and need for structure does suggest that individuals high in need
for closure are more likely to rely on stereotypes (Neuberg and
Newsom, 1993), are more likely to categorize others (Moskowitz,
1993), and in the process pay little attention to and not remember
information that is not already congruent with their expectations
(Dijksterhuis et al., 1996; see also Driscoll et al., 1991). Whereas
categorical processing undoubtedly can have this eﬀect, as
conﬁrmed by the last two experiments reported here, the present
research shows that a heavy reliance on social categorization
might also result, paradoxically, in an increased sensitivity to
the new and unexpected. Participants strongly motivated to
reduce ambiguity and increase structure through categorization
were more likely to recall expectancy-inconsistent information
(Experiments 1–4). This enhanced memory then prompted these
participants to moderate their judgments, such that evaluations
were more less stereotypical or less extreme than for participants
low in DFS (Experiments 2–4). In other words, the present
research conﬁrmed that high DFS does not necessarily imply
closed-mindedness.
This conclusion is supported by two important insights.
First, earlier investigations by Dijksterhuis et al. (1996; as well
as Driscoll et al., 1991) did not actually examine whether
individuals high or low in need for structure varied in their
inclination to engage in to categorical processing or not (but
see Moskowitz, 1993). Investigators provided participants with
explicit category information beforehand, which encouraged
all participants to engage in categorical processing and, in
7Reminiscent of Experiment 3, when participants’ expectancy and the majority of
behaviors were aligned (i.e., participants expected Bob to be intelligent and saw a
majority of intelligent behaviors), the correlation between recall and judgment was
positive, r(54) = 0.17, p = 0.22, though not signiﬁcant. However, when majority of
behaviors and expectancy were not aligned, this was not the case, r(49) = −0.06,
p = 0.68.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 11 July 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 896
Kemmelmeier Need for structure and expectancy-inconsistent information
the process, reduced if not eliminated any inter-individual
variation in the inclination to do so. Thus, the Dijksterhuis
et al. (1996) ﬁndings are clearly limited. When participants were
given a task that was able to reveal inter-individual variability
in the inclination to engage in categorical procession, high
need for structure was related to better recall for impression-
inconsistent information (Experiments 1 and 2), and more
moderate judgments (Experiment 2).
Second, by replicating the ﬁndings by Dijksterhuis et al. (1996)
the present research conﬁrmed that DFS can produce closed-
mindedness, precisely when individuals engage in categorical
processing. Yet, the present research demonstrates that the
consequences of categorical processing and category-based
expectancies are much more context dependent than previously
envisioned by research on need for structure. Extending previous
theorizing (Johnston and Hawley, 1994; Sherman et al., 1998) the
present studies demonstrated that expectancies direct attention in
a way that is most likely to facilitate information processing given
the aﬀordances of the situation. It was argued that for individuals
high in desire-for-structure, categorical processing should direct
attention to that which cannot be taken for granted in a given
situation. When even a cursory inspection had to reveal that the
majority of available information did not match the expectancy,
participants focused more on expectancy-consistent information,
and recalled it better. This pattern is consistent with the notion
that encoding of expected information is facilitated by a well-
developed conceptual structure that allows perceivers to link such
information to what is already known about a target (e.g., Macrae
and Bodenhausen, 2000; Skowronski et al., 2013). However,
broader conclusion is that focusing on expectancy-consistent
information allows high desire-for-structure individuals to
navigate a stream of ambiguous information, most of which
challenges their a priori expectancy. Under these circumstances,
a focus on what is already known is much more likely to
reduce subjective feelings of uncertainty and increase cognitive
structure.
However, when the majority of the encountered evidence
is supportive of one’s expectancy, uncertainty is not reduced
and cognitive structure is not enhanced when participants dwell
on expectancy-consistent information (cf. Sherman et al., 1998,
2004). Rather, in order to increase structure, participants high in
DFS are more likely to attend to information that does challenge
their prior expectancy, possibly because thinking about such
information might allow it to be reconciled with the expectancy.
For instance, if high desire-for-structure participants expect
Bob to be highly intelligent, but learn that he is also a high
school dropout, they might consider that he was bored and
under-challenged, and that he was wasting his time in public
school. Thus, attending to expectancy-inconsistent information
might be driven as much by a motivation to reduce ambiguity
and increase cognitive structure as is attending to expectancy-
consistent information.
At a more general level, the present research suggests that
the consequences of a high need for structure for information
processing must always be theorized within the speciﬁc context
of the task aﬀordances. Much research has reported what are
ultimately main eﬀects for need for structure/need for closure
(e.g., Neuberg and Newsom, 1993; Kruglanski and Webster,
1996; Kruglanski, 2004). However, the present Experiments
3 and 4 demonstrated that variations in the distribution of
the available information alone can dramatically alter the
consequences of individual diﬀerences in need for structure.
There is a long tradition in psychology which argues that
thinking about the social world cannot be examined in isolation
from the characteristics of the social world itself (see Fiedler,
2007 for a recent review). Likewise, it is argued here that the
consequences of need for structure for especially information
allocation cannot be determined conﬁdently without knowing
individuals’ information ecology, i.e., the nature and distribution
of information in their social environment.
Once one acknowledges the critical role of information
ecology, it is evident that Dijksterhuis et al. (1996) tackled a
very speciﬁc situation, namely, one in which participants were
given one third expectancy-consistency, one third expectancy-
inconsistent and one third neutral information (see also
Driscoll et al., 1991). Surely, this speciﬁc distribution of
information was employed to avoid possible confounds resulting
from the diﬀerential distribution of expectancy-consistent and
expectancy-inconsistent (Hastie and Kumar, 1979; Hemsley and
Marmurek, 1982; Bargh and Thein, 1985). However, like more
recent studies examining the impact of need for closure on
category-relevant information (e.g., Kossowska et al., 2012a,b),
this “thirds”-approach severely limits what might be learned
about the implications of need for structure for attention
allocation speciﬁcally, and information processing in general.
Hence, researchers are encouraged to take information ecology
into consideration when examining need for structure eﬀects.
Critically, the present experiments show that the increased
attentiveness and sensitivity to expectancy-consistent
information were mainly a function of only one of two
dimensions of the PNS construct, the desire to structure one’s
life and one’s thinking about one’s social environment in a simple
way (Neuberg and Newsom, 1993). Though the recruitment
of participants for Experiments 1 and 4 did occur based on a
combined PNS score, Experiments 1–3 showed that whenever
DFS and RLS were assessed within the same experimental
session, there was evidence for focal eﬀects to emerge for
DFS, but not necessarily for RLS. This supports the present
contention that it is participants’ motivation to engage in social
categorization as a primary cognition-simplifying process that
is responsible for the observed eﬀects, rather than a typically
aversive RLS. As such, the present research adds to the literature
relating speciﬁc facets of need for structure or need for closure
to speciﬁc social-cognitive phenomena (e.g., Roets and Van Hiel,
2007; Cavazos et al., 2012).
Though the present research contributes to a more complete
understanding on the implications of need for structure for
the processing of expectancy-inconsistent information, it also
poses a number of questions. Prominently, the nature of
the process as to why expectancy-inconsistent information is
more memorable than expectancy-consistent information is not
entirely transparent. It is typically assumed that people are
motivated to reconcile incongruent observations with existing
knowledge, resulting in a memory advantage for this type of
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information (e.g., Srull et al., 1985; Stangor and McMillan,
1992). Yet, evidence tapping this process directly remains elusive
(Heider et al., 2007; Skowronski et al., 2013). Therefore, it is
not entirely clear as to why exactly high need-for-structure
individuals did exhibit better recall memory for expectancy-
inconsistent information. This question is particularly pertinent
because in Experiment 1 such individuals did not exhibit
a recognition advantage. Moreover, in the same study high
DFS participants revealed lower recall memory for expectancy-
consistent information. Even though this ﬁnding did not replicate
in Experiments 2–4, the issue clearly deserves further study.
That high need-for-closure participants in Experiment 1 did
rely on categorical processing was evident in the elevated
false alarms rates for newly presented expectancy-consistent
information—a telltale sign that participants were guided by
category-based expectancies. Somewhat confusingly, though,
there was some evidence that the same participants also falsely
recognized expectancy-inconsistent information as evidenced in
the response bias scores obtained as part of Experiment 1. This
shows that participants were especially attuned to expectancy-
relevant information, regardless of whether consistent or
inconsistent with their expectancies; however, the pattern
highlights that the underlying process is not yet clear (cf.
Skowronski et al., 2013).
Experiments 2 and 3, though not Experiment 4, demonstrated
that in the present paradigm recall memory and judgments
about the target were related. To the extent that participants
were more likely to recall evidence that contradicted the overall
impression, they were more moderate in their evaluation of the
target. That is, just as Dijksterhuis et al. (1996) demonstrated that
high need-for-structure participants’ lower recall of stereotype-
inconsistent information led to more stereotypical judgments,
the previous research demonstrated that the same recall-based
judgment process might lead to the opposite tendency.
Though it should not be surprising that participants relied
on their memory for speciﬁc behaviors when evaluating a target
person whom they had only learned about minutes beforehand,
arguably demonstrating a link between encoding processes and
recall is somewhat more impressive. Experiment 4 showed that
the longer participants devoted to thinking about expectancy-
inconsistent relative to expectancy-consistent information, the
more likely were they recall the former relative to the latter,
conceptually replicating Stern et al. (1984). Yet, there was little
evidence of a link between reading times and judgment. Although
this mirrors Dijksterhuis et al. (1996), it stands to reason that
the self-paced exposure to expectancy-consistent or expectancy-
inconsistent information may have disrupted any link between
recall memory and memory-based judgment, possibly because
participants formed judgments on-line (Hastie and Park, 1986).
The present research faces at least two important limitations.
First, Kossowska et al. (2012b) recently determined that the
eﬀects of need for structure vary by age. Speciﬁcally, among
younger adults (20–26 years) higher levels of need for structure
were linked to greater categorical processing such that high need-
for-structure participants were more likely to recall expectancy-
consistent information than low need-for-structure participants,
whereas this relationship was reversed among older adults
(65 years and older). Moreover, these authors observed that
among older adults, high levels of need for structure were linked
to better memory for expectancy-irrelevant (neutral) information
(see also Kossowska et al., 2012a). This aging-related dynamic
was not captured in the present series of studies, where the focus
was exclusively on a college-aged population8. Note, that these
authors relied on a task that resembled Driscoll et al. (1991)
and Dijksterhuis et al. (1996) in that it provided participants
with a category label about whom participants subsequently
learned equal numbers of expectancy-consistent, expectancy-
inconsistent and neutral characteristics (see above).
A second limitation arises from the fact that the present
research did not measure the participants’ subjective ability
to fulﬁll their need for closure. Research by Bar-Tal et al.
(1997) and Kossowska and Bar-Tal (2013) have documented
that sometimes individuals high in need for structure feel
unable to employ a processing style that will reduce uncertainty
and ambiguity. Using the same paradigm as Kossowska et al.
(2012b), Kossowska and Bar-Tal (2013, Study 1) demonstrated
that only among participants high in “ability to achieve closure”
did need for structure predict lower recall of expectancy-
inconsistent information, whereas no such relationship existed
for participants low on this ability dimension. In other words,
ability to achieve closure likely serves as a moderator, which
qualiﬁes the strength, but not the direction, of any eﬀects
of need for structure on memory for expectancy-consistent
and expectancy-inconsistent information9. This implies that the
omission of this variable from present investigation does not
call into question any of its conclusions, even when it is clear
that an additional level of complexity exists—a notion further
corroborated by the observation that need for structure and
ability to achieve closure are uncorrelated (Kossowska and Bar-
Tal, 2013).
Still, future research should examine to what extent ability
to achieve closure qualiﬁes any need for structure eﬀects in a
paradigm in which, unlike in Kossowska and Bar-Tal (2013,
Study 1) and Dijksterhuis et al. (1996), participants are not
provided with an a priori category label by the experimenter.
Likewise, it would be interesting to see if ability to achieve closure
does qualify need for structure eﬀects when the information
ecology is varied. Employing this variable would also be of
great theoretical interest because the eﬀects demonstrated here
have to be attributed to one of two dimensions of the PNS
construct, namely DFS (Neuberg and Newsom, 1993). It would
be important to know if eﬀects of subjective ability are speciﬁc to
this one dimension of whether it generalizes to all dimensions,
especially if one considers other measure of need for closure,
namely the need for closure scale (Webster and Kruglanski,
1994), distinguish a total of ﬁve sub-dimensions.
8Kossowska et al. (2012b) reported that NFC was associated with lower recall for
expectancy-inconsistent information, Study 1, r = −0.19 and Study 2, r = −0.06,
though these coeﬃcients were not signiﬁcant. Separate correlations for younger
and older adults were not provided.
9Kossowska and Bar-Tal (2013) found that need for structure qualiﬁed the recall
of neutral information, such that need for structure was related to greater recall
when “ability to achieve closure” was low, but lower recall when “ability to achieve
closure” was high.
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In closing, it is often thought that high need for structure
ushers in categorical processing. When relying on categorical
processing, a perceiver is always at risk of pigeonholing new
acquaintances, of rendering them exchangeable members of a
social category that has been activated in the perceiver’s mind.
However, categorical processing may also provide perceivers
with expectancies about newly encountered others in the ﬁrst
place. That is, perceivers who categorize and as a consequence
hold expectancies must determine whether a particular piece
of information about the new acquaintance is expected or
unexpected. To the extent that a new acquaintance is not a typical
member of an activated social category, high need-for-structure
individuals may discover much unexpected information, which
will grab their attention and, presumably, requires them to think.
Ironically, this may commit high need-for-structure perceivers
to investing considerable cognitive eﬀort—very much contrary
to their general inclination to reduce processing eﬀort (Neuberg
and Newsom, 1993; Kruglanski, 2004). Equally ironically, under
such circumstances high need-for-cognition perceivers are more
likely to incorporate information into their judgment, which
contradicts an earlier expectancy about a target. That is, when
high need-for-structure individuals enter a situation without
clear expectancies or with an expectancy that is clearly not
supported by the evidence, their tendency to over-rely on social
categories may have at its roots the undoing of this very over-
reliance. Information that does not ﬁt will “stick out.”
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